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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the advocacy coalition framework is to explain policy change over time 
through an examination of the stability of advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems. 
Recently, scholars have confirmed that advocacy coalitions are held together by shared 
belief systems, specifically in distributive policy arenas. We contend that federal 
agencies, in distributive policy arenas, provide both the anchors and support systems 
for the development and maintenance of belief systems. This anchoring helps provide 
adequate resources, access to political institutions, ability to control administrative 
process, and/or the capacity to deliver public goods and services. We conducted an 
analysis of the policy changes that occurred during the implementation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act for the construction of the Bureau of Reclamation’s Animas-La 
Plata project. This is an example where administrators, through the management of 
information, were able to control the policy process. The analysis provides a needed 
replication of previous findings regarding policy change and offers new insights into how 
institutions are critical to subsystem stability over time.  
 
Members of the public and the media often treat administrators and agencies as 
bystanders in the policy process. Members of Congress debate, presidents appoint 
and manage, justices choose, interest groups and their supporters cajole, while 
administrators—especially the rank-and-file bureaucrats—sit on the sidelines and 
wait for orders. Of course scholars know that agencies matter, but what if they are 
most important? What if administrators in agencies direct the policymaking process 
through coordination with allies and manipulation of the legal process? 
 
This is not a simple question. When one agency directs and wins a debate, for 
example, another agency almost certainly loses. Or, more often than not, one agency 
makes more concessions in policy conflicts than another. Hence, the exercise of 
administrative power is almost certainly a process, like everything in politics, of 
give-and-take and nuance. Scholars of bureaucratic politics have long noted that 
successful agencies struggle to control the policy process through deft management 
of expertise and their clientele, along with the possession of capable leadership and 
organizational vitality (Clark & McCool, 1985; Rourke, 1984; Seidman & Gilmour, 1986). 
Both Wilson (1978, 1989) and Carpenter (2001) contend that administrators 
seek to protect their policymaking autonomy through the use of expertise and 
maintenance of information. And other scholars maintain that administrators 
struggle to aggrandize their agencies, like any firm in the private sector, through 
competition for an ever-greater share of the public market (Downs, 1967; Holden, 
1966; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965). Others have acknowledged the internal and 
external factors that influence agency power and autonomy (Eisner, 2000; Meier & 
Bohte, 2007). 
 
Early theories of policy formulation, especially the iron triangle (or 
subgovernment) concept in distributive policy arenas, placed agencies at the center of 
the policymaking process as they worked with clientele and key members of Congress 
to secure the authority and funds needed to develop resources and build projects 
(Maass, 1951; Mann, 1975; McCool, 1994; Miller, 1985; Redford, 1969). The 
implementation literature, within the context of administrative activity, is also constructed 
on the fundamental insight that a gap exists between the legislative formulation of 
public policy and the administration implementation of it. In response, the 
implementation problem has been approached from top-down (Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1984), bottom-up (Lipsky, 1983), and third-generation perspectives (Goggin, 
Bowman, Lester, & O’Toole, 1990)—each with an eye toward the construction of 
public policies that administrators can accept and implement. 
 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) also seeks to address the gap between 
formulation and implementation—indeed, it was created in an “effort to synthesize 
the best features of both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches to [the implementation] 
stage of the policy process” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 178)—by 
focusing on subsystem-level explanations for policy change. The essence of the ACF 
is that public policies and programs can be “conceptualized in the same manner as 
belief systems” because they reflect the values, priorities, and causal assumptions of 
their creators (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 178; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 
2009). Furthermore, Sabatier andWeible (2007) recently described three “foundation 
stones” on which the ACF is constructed: (i) “a macro-level assumption that most 
policy-making occurs among specialists” who are affected by broader factors; (ii) “a 
micro-level model of the individual”; and (iii) “a meso-level conviction that the best 
way to deal with the multiplicity of actors in the subsystem is to aggregate them into 
advocacy coalitions” (pp. 191–92). 
 
Both the argument that policies and programs are best conceptualized as belief 
systems and the three foundational stones—self-interested specialists working 
within subsystems—necessarily place agencies and their administrators at the center 
of advocacy coalitions because belief systems are largely articulated and maintained 
through administrative activity (Ellison, 1998a, 1998b). One shortcoming of the ACF, 
therefore, is that it fails to say straight-out that certain kinds of specialists and certain 
kinds of actors will necessarily dominate policymaking in subsystems by virtue of 
the sources of bureaucratic authority (Carpenter, 2001; Ellison, 1998a, 1998b;Wilson, 
1978, 1989). These sources together—expertise, professionalism, constituency 
support, esprit-de-corps—contribute to agency autonomy, or the ability of managers 
in agencies, and their allies, to maintain jurisdiction over critical policy arenas 
(Carpenter, 2001; Wilson, 1978, 1989). These specialists, for example, include 
engineers in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) and U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, biologists in the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service (FWS), and foresters in the 
U.S. Forest Service, who compete within subsystems to control decisions. 
 
The Bureau’s effort to construct the Animas-La Plata (ALP) project in 
southwestern Colorado provides one example of how administrators in advocacy 
coalitions manage information to control the policymaking process. In 1998, Ellison 
assessed the analytical utility of the ACF through a case study of the ALP project and 
implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). At issue, in 1991, was the 
Bureau’s ability to achieve a construction start on the project in the face of a draft 
jeopardy biological opinion, a finding by the U.S. FWS that ALP would harm the 
endangered Colorado pikeminnow. Ellison demonstrated how the distributive advocacy 
coalition within the policy subsystem was able to outperform regulatory interests 
through the domination of administrative process—although, as predicted by the 
ACF, only by conceding secondary aspects of their belief systems. Moreover, Ellison 
demonstrated that successful distributive advocacy coalitions must be anchored or 
supported with resources, access to institutions, and the capacity to deliver services 
by agencies capable of dominating administrative process because updating benefit– 
cost analyses, completing environmental impact statements, complying with the 
ESA, etc. have become the essence of distributive politics (Ellison, 1998a, 1998b).1 
 
Today, although doomed in 1991, the $668 million dollar ALP project is near 
completion.2 The purpose of this paper is to replicate Ellison’s 1998 study and 
findings. Here we assess the analytical utility of the ACF by examining the stability 
of policy-producing coalitions over time in the context of the Bureau’s struggle to 
build the ALP project in southwestern Colorado, and to demonstrate how agency 
competition dominates policy change in subsystems. This allows us to determine 
what has happened to a policy subsystem that is over 40 years old and to gauge the 
long-term stability of coalitions and their belief systems, as well as the degree of 
control over outputs. In the following sections, we will review the ACF and reintroduce 
the hypotheses used in the 1998 study, provide an updated ALP case study, 
assess the analytical utility of the hypotheses, and offer a discussion on the role of 
agencies in the ACF. 
 
Revisiting the ACF 
 
As noted above, the purpose of the ACF is to explain policy change, and 
subsequently to understand how advocacy coalitions come together to control 
policy subsystems. In the broad-ranging area of environmental policy, the ACF has 
been used extensively (Burnett & Davis, 2002; Elliot & Schlaepfer, 2001a, 2001b; 
Ellison, 1998a, 1998b; Kim, 2003; Leach & Sabatier, 2005; Litfin, 2000; Smith, 2000; 
Weible, 2005), probably because as Litfin (2000, p. 238) notes, “The ACF is ideally 
suited to the analysis of environmental policy processes.”3 The ACF is constructed 
on four fundamental premises. First, the ACF contends that understanding policy 
change requires a time perspective of a decade or more in order to account for a 
full policy cycle (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994, p. 178). Second, it argues that policy 
subsystems—collections of agencies, groups, politicians, and citizens with a 
stake in a particular policy arena—make the most useful unit of analysis for 
understanding policy change. Third, the ACF argues that there must be an 
intergovernmental dimension to policy subsystems. And fourth, “public policies or 
programs can be conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems, i.e., as sets of 
value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them” (Jenkins-Smith & 
Sabatier, 1994, p. 178; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). 
 
Like personal belief systems, the belief systems of political actors exist on 
several levels according to the rigidness to which they are held. Deep core beliefs exist 
at the top of the belief system and are resistant to change. They reflect fundamental 
ideas about politics and governing, such as liberal versus conservative or religious 
versus secular values (Weible et al., 2009). Policy core beliefs exist at the middle level 
and are the “glue” that hold advocacy coalitions together: Developers believe in 
development, free market conservatives are opposed to taxation, environmentalists 
support regulatory programs, etc. (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pp. 7–8). Hence, 
policy core beliefs prescribe a bounded set of policy solutions to a given public problem. 
Finally, secondary aspects of belief systems go to the details of policy solutions and 
are the most susceptible to modification and adjustment (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 
1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997; Weible et al., 2009). 
 
The mechanics of the ACF work as follows: Actors within policy subsystems 
organize around shared belief systems into advocacy coalitions, which then vie for 
control of the subsystem and seek to dominate substantive policy and administrative 
outputs. The dependent variable in the ACF is policy change because the substance 
of policy and administrative outputs reflects the fortunes of different actors in the 
policy subsystem. Policy change can occur in four ways. First, external subsystem 
events, such as an election or an economic crisis, can force policy change (Zafonte & 
Sabatier, 2004; cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). Elliot and Schlaepfer’s (2001a, 
2001b) studies of forest certification in Sweden note that international events influence 
the policy subsystem. Similarly, building on ‘tHart and Boin (2001) and Birkland’s 
(2006) work on policy change following catastrophic events, Nohrestedt 
(2008) examines how the Chernobyl crisis influenced Swedish nuclear energy policy. 
Second, sometimes policy change is created when analysis—in the form of benefit– 
cost analysis, risk assessment, environmental impact analysis, efficiency created 
through better engineering, or other forms of feedback—has a heuristic effect on 
members of the subsystem. This is called policy-oriented learning (James & Jorgensen, 
2009; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997). Much 
of the ACF literature addresses policy-oriented learning whereby behaviors are 
influenced by new information and experience (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
Learning can help bolster coalition belief systems (Litfin, 2000; Meijerink, 2005; 
Weible et al., 2009), although learning is also more likely to change secondary belief 
systems than primary ones (Ellison, 1998a, 1998b;Weible et al., 2009). Third, internal 
subsystem events may also cause policy change, such as when key members of 
advocacy coalitions leave the subsystem. This is not surprising given work by Munro 
(1993), Andersson (1999), and Zafonte and Sabatier, who note how members of the 
coalition may exit (Weible et al., 2009). Fourth, policy change can occur in response 
to alternative dispute resolution in which coalitions can sometimes safely work out 
differences (Weible et al., 2009). 
 
The ALP case provides a good fit for the ACF assumptions: The policy change 
described occurred over a decade; the advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem 
are relatively easy to identify; the case involves federal, state, local, and tribal 
governments and agencies; learning took place through a complicated process 
involving the acquisition of scientific, legal, and technical knowledge; and belief 
systems are apparent (construction or regulation of the project), with developers and 
regulators vying for control of the subsystem. Moreover, given that the project is 
near completion, we can reexamine it further along in the policy process than in 
Ellison’s original study. We provide hypotheses in the following sections in order to 
address advocacy coalition stability, policy change, and policy-oriented learning. 
 
Advocacy Coalitions 
 
The ACF predicts that advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems will remain 
stable over a period of a decade or more (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Mazmanian 
& Sabatier, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). We will begin by examining the 
coalitions and comparing them with those that dominated the subsystem in 1991.We 
would expect that the primary policy goals will remain stable provided there is 
stability among the coalition that initiated the policy, although it is possible that 
members of coalitions may exit the subsystem over time (Andersson, 1999; Munro, 
1993; Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004). If coalition members leave the subsystem, it is 
possible that policy change may result. The key factor in examining policy change is 
whether or not the core belief systems are altered following the exit of coalition 
members. We borrow directly from the ACF to reexamine ALP: 
 
Hypothesis 1: “On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy 
core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather 
stable over periods of a decade or so (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997 [H1]).” 
 
Policy Change 
 
One critical advantage of the ACF is that it is able to account for sophistication 
and nuance in policy conflicts. In the ALP case study, for example, the solution to 
water problems in southwestern Colorado—whether water scarcity, water plentitude, 
water wars, endangered species protection, or Native American municipal and 
industrial water supplies—has always been construction of the project. The nuance, 
therefore, in the ACF is that it can account for advocacy coalition stability even if 
external events seem to challenge relationships in policy subsystems. Hence, the 
resilience of core policy attributes reflects the stability of the relationships among 
advocacy coalitions: 
Hypothesis 2: “The policy core attributes of a governmental program are unlikely 
to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition which 
instituted the program remains in power” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997 [H4]). 
 
Given the substantial length of time from the inception of ALP to the present, we 
would expect some turnover in the members of the coalitions. Yet other members 
should be stable, resulting in little change in core policy attributes. 
 
Policy-Oriented Learning 
 
Policy-oriented learning is a key feature of the ACF literature and is more likely 
to occur during the types of technical disputes that dominate administrative processes. 
Policy-oriented learning requires that two or more coalitions have the technical 
capacity to participate in debate and occurs when secondary aspects of belief 
systems are in dispute (Litfin, 2000; Meijerink, 2005; Weible et al., 2009). Hence, we 
retest the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: “Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when 
there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between two coalitions. This 
requires that: (a) each has the technical resources to engage in such a debate; 
and that (b) the conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and 
core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important secondary 
aspects of the two belief systems” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997 [H6]). 
 
About the ALP Case Study 
 
The ALP case study has been constructed over the past 15 years through 
dozens of interviews with ALP stakeholders and site visits in Colorado and New Mexico 
(Ellison, 1998a, 1998b). There are two aspects of the case study that are critical to a 
deep, process-oriented analysis of this type of political activity: the narrative and the 
types of outputs that are examined. Although this is not a narrative analysis (Roe, 
1994), understanding the story of the ALP project is essential to understanding 
process (Yin, 2008) in policy subsystems. For example, one important caveat of the 
story is that administrators in the Bureau of Reclamation spent years arguing for 
the project in the name of water scarcity and have now spent years arguing for the 
project in the name of water plentitude. Although this sounds improbable, these 
twists are made through administrative activities designed to implement environmental 
legislation. Hence, the case study has primarily focused on policy change in 
the content of administrative outputs. Section 7 consultations, artifacts of ESA 
implementation, were used for the 1998 analysis. This analysis is based on the 2000 
Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) for the Animas-La Plata 
project, an artifact of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In each of these 
cases, legislation was passed to ratify administrative findings even though the findings 
contradicted themselves and were contrary to broader environmental protection 
objectives. 
Pattern matching is used in this explanatory case study, in which the predicted 
outcomes, via ACF hypotheses, are compared with the actual outcomes (Yin, 2008). 
Testimonial data used for this paper were collected through 13 personal interviews 
conducted with project proponents and opponents—representing local, state, tribal, 
and federal agencies, elected officials, and environmental activists—on two research 
trips to Denver and Durango, Colorado, and Albuquerque, New Mexico, in May 
2006 and March 2008.4 Documentary and archival data on the ALP project were 
collected during these trips at local, state, tribal, and federal agencies and online. 
Triangulation of data is used in this paper to support substantive points and to shore 
up internal validity in the case study (Stoecker, 1991; Yin, 2008). The interviews and 
sources above were used to determine coalition membership and information on 
policy-oriented learning and policy change. 
 
The ALP Project and Settlement of Native American Water Rights 
 
The initial purpose of the ALP project, proposed as early as 1904, was to move 
water from the abundant Animas River, which drains the San Juan Mountains and 
flows steeply through rock and crevice above Durango, Colorado, to the drier La 
Plata River where the land is flatter and more suitable for irrigated agriculture. 
Congress called for a feasibility report in 1956, delivered in 1966, which described 
ALP as a dam and reservoir high on the Animas River with a gravity flow diversion 
to the La Plata River. ALP was authorized for construction in 1968, along with the 
Central Arizona Project and four other Colorado water projects, in the Colorado 
River Basin Project Act (Decker, 1991; Ellison, 1998a, 2009). 
Bureau engineers redesigned ALP in the 1970s in response to a variety of 
economic and environmental concerns. In 1979, the Bureau issued a Definite Plan 
Report for ALP that described a project in which water would be lifted hundreds of 
feet out of the Animas River for storage in a series of off-river reservoirs for eventual 
delivery via gravity flow to the La Plata River watershed (Bureau, 1979). Despite the 
redesign, Congress was not able to appropriate funds for ALP because it could not 
pass tests of economic feasibility and because a series of environmental problems 
had not been resolved (Decker, 1991; Ellison, 1999, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, in 1972, the Ute Mountain Ute Indians sued for adjudication and 
quantification of the water rights on their reservation. The water rights issues became 
truly contentious when the Southern Ute Tribe joined the lawsuit because most of the 
irrigable acreage and water on their reservation belongs to Anglo farmers who settled 
there or purchased the land after the reservation was opened to homesteading in 
1899; the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe did not accept the federal government’s land 
allotment program so their reservation belongs entirely to them. Hence, it is important 
to understand that for the most part, ALP is a reclamation project that was to be 
constructed for Anglo farmers on the Southern Ute Reservation, although irrigation 
would have been extended to the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes if 
constructed according to the original plans (Ellison, 1999, 2009). 
 
As the lawsuit, taken up by the U.S. Department of Justice, wound its way 
through the court system, calls by the Carter and then the Reagan Administrations for 
nonfederal cost sharing forced project proponents to develop two agreements in 
1986 that were designed to resolve both the Native American water rights claims and 
federal calls for cost sharing (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1986). ALP would be 
constructed in two phases under the terms of the agreements. Phase one would 
include the economically justifiable pieces of the project and would be constructed 
and financed by the Bureau. Phase two would be paid for by the states and would be 
built on an indeterminate schedule. In exchange for quantification of their water 
rights on the reservations, water rights in the ALP and Dolores projects, and a $60 
million tribal development fund, the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes 
agreed to relinquish their water rights claims if phase one of ALP was completed by 
2000. Congress ratified these agreements in the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights 
Settlement Act of 1988 (PL 100–585). 
 
The ESA requires that action agencies consult with the U.S. FWS when a project 
impacts an endangered or threatened species and when new information regarding 
those impacts becomes available. In May 1990, just as the Bureau was to begin 
construction on ALP, the Service determined that ALP would harm the endangered 
Colorado pikeminnow and issued a draft jeopardy biological opinion without a 
Reasonable and Prudent Alternative (RPA; Ellison, 1998a). This decision meant that 
the project would not go forward unless the Bureau and theFWScould develop a plan 
to allow both the project and the pikeminnow to coexist. After contentious negotiations, 
the FWS issued a final jeopardy biological opinion on ALP that did include an 
RPA. Two elements formed the heart of the seven-year timeline for the RPA: (i) The 
Bureau agreed to limit the construction of the ALP project to three initial features— 
Ridges Basin Reservoir, Durango Pumping Plant, and the inlet conduit—and to limit 
depletions from the Animas River to 57,100 acre-feet; and (ii) to spill three hundred 
thousand acre-feet of water from Navajo Reservoir to mimic the natural hydrograph 
for the benefit of the Colorado pikeminnow (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1991). 
 
Both of these components were contentious because they violated the spirit of 
congressional intent for ALP and harmed the Navajo Nation, which had a prior claim on 
the water spilled from Navajo Reservoir (Ellison, 1998a, 2009; Gosnell, 2001). The 
implementing regulations for the ESA states that an alternative is reasonable and 
prudent if it can be implemented according to the intended purposes of a project, avoids 
jeopardy to the species, is within the agency’s legal authority, and is economically and 
technically feasible (50 C.F.R. Part 402, Final Rule, Federal Register, June 3, 1986). 
The construction of these three initial features would not transfer water to the La Plata 
River or have an irrigation component. Perhaps most importantly, the 
Bureau did not do an economic feasibility analysis on the three features because they 
would produce no benefits and represented only an incremental step in the construction 
of the entire project—a contention that is in clear violation of reclamation law and the 
implementing regulations for the ESA (Ellison, 1998a). 
 
ALP and Implementation of the National EPA 
 
With their project in disarray and under fire from a variety of groups and 
agencies, such as the Navajo Nation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. FWS, the 
U.S. EPA, etc., the Bureau reorganized. Bureau administrators authored yet another 
environmental impact statement—designed to justify a different purpose for theALP 
project—settled their issues with the Navajo Nation by promising to build a municipal 
pipeline for them, sought and earned reauthorization for the project in the Colorado Ute 
Settlement Act Amendments of 2000 (PL 106–554), and are nearly ready to fill the 
newly built and renamed Nighthorse Reservoir with water from the Animas River. Most 
impressively, this was done by eliminating project beneficiaries rather than adding them. 
The nearly complete $668 million ALP project does not provide a single drop of water to 
anyone, although it does store small amounts of municipal and industrial water for 
several water users who have no capacity to deliver municipal and industrial water, 
including 33,050 acre-feet of water for the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes. 
Still, as improbable as this reads, Bureau administrators were able to do this without a 
water right for the project (Doe & Maynard, 2008). 
 
The most important political variable that gave Bureau administrators the 
leverage they needed to seek reauthorization of ALP was the Colorado Ute Water 
Rights Settlement Act of 1988 (PL 100–585). This statute, as noted earlier, settled 
Native American water rights claims by establishing a 2000 construction deadline for 
ALP (Ellison, 1998a). Thus, as endangered species, scientific, and fiscal processes 
made it clear that this deadline would not be met, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt 
and Colorado governor Roy Romer created a process designed to resolve the ALP 
impasse in the mid-1990s. The Romer/Schoettler Process—also named after Colorado 
Lt. Governor Gail Schoettler—brought a variety of groups to the negotiating table—
including several project opponents such as Earth Justice—and produced a justification 
for a scaled-down ALP-Lite with both structural and nonstructural components that 
could be used to meet the needs of the Ute Tribes. These components included, for 
example, the expansion of existing federal water storage facilities in the San Juan River 
Basin, water conservation proposals, and a fund for the acquisition of water rights 
(Marston, 1996). 
 
Although a catalyst for change, Secretary Babbitt rejected the Romer/Schoettler 
proposal and instead entered a series of secret negotiations with the Ute Tribes and 
the project proponents (Doe & Maynard, 2008; Marston, 1996). The result of these 
negotiations was an ALP project that eliminated the irrigation component, included 
a municipal and industrial reservoir for the Ute Tribes, the Navajo Nation, and 
several special districts, provided a $40 million fund for the Ute Tribes to purchase 
water rights, and offered to construct the Navajo Nation Municipal Pipeline. 
Included in the proposal—which came to be known as the Administration proposal in 
the environmental analysis—was a promise to subject the project to a “full 
environmental review, including a review of competing non-structural proposals to settle 
the Tribes’ water rights claims” (Hayes, 2000, p. 3). 
 
One fundamental problem that Bureau officials confronted in conducting a new 
environmental analysis of ALP was undoing decades of work that supported the 
argument that the purpose of the ALP project was irrigation. Indeed, the Bureau 
argued in the 1966 Feasibility Study, the 1979 Definite Plan Report, the 1980 
Final Environmental Impact Statement, the 1991 Biological Opinion, the 1996 Final 
Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement, and other administrative 
documents that the purpose of ALP was to bring irrigation water to the “dry side,” 
or the La Plata River watershed; all of these administrative documents were ratified 
by Congress in various statutes (Ellison, 2009). 
 
Three things needed to be done to address this argumentation problem. First, the 
Bureau had to eliminate the irrigation component without losing the project outright. 
Second, the Bureau needed to appease rival water users in the San Juan River Basin. 
And third, all of this needed to be sanctioned by Congress. At the heart of all these 
activities was the need to develop an environmental impact statement—in conjunction 
with the recommendations of the Romer/Schoettler process—that provided an 
administrative justification for a scaled-down ALP project and that gave the competing 
interests in the San Juan River Basin their due. 
 
The environmental impact analysis gave Bureau officials the opportunity to 
eliminate the irrigation component and redefine the project. This redefinition of the 
project came in two parts. In the first part, Bureau officials brazenly noted that they 
were never able to prove that the project made sense from an environmental 
perspective despite all the administrative activity and studies on it. Indeed, in its 2000 
Record of Decision, the Bureau stated that 
 
the original project was not constructed because this Department, and many 
other parties, raised serious concerns regarding the environmental 
consequences 
of building the project. These consequences included a large diversion 
from the Animas River which would violate Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) requirements and water quality impacts associated with a major new 
non-Indian project in the Four Corners region. (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
2000b, p. 1) 
 
Although innocuous, this statement confirms that water-quality impacts—that is, the 
high selenium content in irrigation runoff from non-Indian farming, a longstanding 
issue for the Environmental Protection Agency (Lemly, 1997)—were an impediment 
to project construction. 
 
Second, through the Record of Decision and related administrative documents, 
Bureau officials maintained their obligation to Native American trust responsibilities, 
specifically the water rights claims of the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute 
Tribes, and the constant threat of “extensive litigation” if these claims were not 
redressed (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000b). These contentions, along with the 
2000 construction deadline established by the Colorado Ute Water Rights Settlement 
Act of 1988, produced the “purpose and need” for the new ALP project, which is the 
fundamental concept that drove the analysis for the environmental impact statement. 
The “purpose and need” of the ALP project was to 
implement the Settlement Act by providing the Ute Tribes an assured longterm 
water supply and water acquisition fund in order to satisfy the Tribes’ 
senior water rights claims as quantified in the Settlement Act, and to provide 
for identified M&I needs in the project area. (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
2000a, vol. 1, chap. 5, p. 21) 
The analysis in the new environmental impact statement focused on the assessment 
of various alternatives designed to address the Colorado Ute Tribes’ water rights 
claims. These included the Administration Proposal at various reservoir levels, 
increasing the size of federal water facilities in the area, and nonstructural alternatives 
such as water leasing and the establishment of a fund to purchase water rights. 
These alternatives would be compared with the purpose and need and assessed 
along four dimensions: yield, reliability, location, and practicality. Yield refers to 
whether the project will provide “wet water” to the tribes, reliability refers to whether the 
alternative will be renewed by the hydrological cycle, location refers to whether water 
from the alternative will be “reasonably available” to the tribes, and practicability refers 
to whether the alternative is technically feasible (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). 
 
These criteria ensure that only the administration proposal—the same project 
the Bureau hoped to build under the 1991 RPA—would be acceptable. Moreover, 
since the administration proposal defined ALP as a Native American water rights 
project, it became subject to the rules of the Indian Self Determination and Education 
Assistance Act (PL 93–638), which gives Native Americans a substantive stake in the 
nature of the public goods and services they receive from the United States. In this 
case, the effect of tribal participation in the administrative process was to give the 
Colorado Ute Tribes a veto over any alternative that did not meet their claims, which up-
front did not include nonstructural alternatives, the expansion of existing facilities, or 
water leasing—i.e., the alternatives that were under consideration in the environmental 
impact analysis (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000b). 
 
There were two additional problems that went to the Bureau’s assessment of 
ALP as a municipal and industrial water supply for Native Americans, both of which 
were analyzed in the ALP Final Environmental Impact Statement: (i) finding demand 
for municipal and industrial water, and (ii) addressing the risks associated with changing 
water rights from irrigation to municipal and industrial. In the 2000 environmental impact 
analysis, the Bureau assessed municipal and industrial demand through an analysis of 
nonbinding water-use scenarios. These scenarios were purely speculative. The Bureau, 
for example, used data from the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate that the Native 
American population on the reservations would increase from 3,287 in 1998 to 15,000 in 
2100. The result of this strictly linear projection, Bureau officials argued, would be a 
future housing shortage and resultant demand for new municipal and industrial water on 
the reservation. Other scenarios included an industrial park scenario, recreation and 
tourism scenario, energy development scenario, livestock and wildlife development 
scenarios, and regional water supply scenario (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). 
Although serving as the basis for ALP, the Bureau noted that each of these scenarios 
was nonbinding and would require the construction of new structural components that 
would be subject to future NEPA review. The benefit of this nonbinding scenario 
approach, the Bureau contended, was that it “respects the Colorado Ute Tribes’ 
sovereignty and protects their ability to allocate water in accordance with future needs 
consistent with federal law” (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000b, p. 3). 
 
The second problem arose with respect to the nonstructural component of ALP 
as envisioned in the administration proposal alternative. Under the 1988 Settlement 
Act, the Colorado Ute Tribes were entitled to over seventy-nine thousand acre-feet of 
water. But because this water was for irrigation—which has a smaller return flow 
than municipal and industrial water—the entitlement was reduced to approximately 
52,960 acre-feet, of which 39,960 acre-feet would be stored in Nighthorse Reservoir 
(U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). The remaining thirteen thousand acre-feet will 
be acquired though the purchase of land and water rights on or near the reservations 
through the $40 million water acquisition fund established by the 2000 Colorado Ute 
Settlement Act Amendments (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). The problem, 
however, is that the purchase of land and water rights on a willing-seller/willing buyer 
basis, and the conversion of those water rights is no simple matter and may take 10–30 
years to complete. The Bureau notes that the risks associated with this approach 
include but are not limited to the risk of availability of lands with senior water rights, the 
risk associated with estimating the rate of inflation of land prices, the risk associated 
with the assumption that there would be no disruption to market prices of land, and the 
risks of encountering higher costs resulting from a longer procurement period for land 
purchases (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). These risks must be added to the 
problem of converting fee simple farmland to Indian trust land, which will reduce local 
tax bases, and of course the problem of converting these water rights from irrigation to 
municipal and industrial in the Colorado water courts. Bureau officials warn: 
 
[s]everal legal considerations and constraints that may affect the change of 
irrigation water rights to M&I use, include but are not limited to . . . the need 
for court approval . . . the need to deal with numerous objectors . . . time 
required for change can be substantial . . . uncertainty of outcome. (U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a, vol. 1, chap. 2, pp. 2–16) 
 
Hence, the administrative findings used to justify reauthorization of ALP were 
constructed on the argument that the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes 
should settle their claims for the construction of a municipal and industrial water 
project for which there is no water right, no demand, and no capacity to deliver the 
water. Furthermore, all this was to be done to avoid costly litigation over water rights—
the costs of which were never determined. Based on these arguments, Congress 
reauthorized ALP in the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, which gave 
the Bureau the authority to construct, operate and maintain “a reservoir, a pumping 
plant, a reservoir inlet conduit, and appurtenant facilities with sufficient capacity to divert 
and store water from the Animas River to provide for an average annual depletion of 
57,100 acre-feet of water to be used for a municipal and industrial water supply . . .” 
 
Advocacy Coalitions 
The ACF predicts that advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems will remain 
stable over a period of a decade or more (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Mazmanian 
& Sabatier, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). We will begin by examining the 
coalitions and comparing them with those that dominated the subsystem in 1991.We 
would expect that the primary policy goals will remain stable provided there is 
stability among the coalition that initiated the policy, although it is possible that 
members of coalitions may exit the subsystem over time (Andersson, 1999; Munro, 
1993; Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004). If coalition members leave the subsystem, it is 
possible that policy change may result. The key factor in examining policy change is 
whether or not the core belief systems are altered following the exit of coalition 
members. We borrow directly from the ACF to reexamine ALP: 
 
Hypothesis 1: “On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy 
core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather 
stable over periods of a decade or so (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997 [H1]).” 
 
Policy Change 
One critical advantage of the ACF is that it is able to account for sophistication 
and nuance in policy conflicts. In the ALP case study, for example, the solution to 
water problems in southwestern Colorado—whether water scarcity, water plentitude, 
water wars, endangered species protection, or Native American municipal and 
industrial water supplies—has always been construction of the project. The nuance, 
therefore, in the ACF is that it can account for advocacy coalition stability even if 
external events seem to challenge relationships in policy subsystems. Hence, the 
resilience of core policy attributes reflects the stability of the relationships among 
advocacy coalitions: 
 
Hypothesis 2: “The policy core attributes of a governmental program are unlikely 
to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition which 
instituted the program remains in power” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997 [H4]). 
 
Given the substantial length of time from the inception of ALP to the present, we 
would expect some turnover in the members of the coalitions. Yet other members 
should be stable, resulting in little change in core policy attributes. 
 
Policy-Oriented Learning 
 
Policy-oriented learning is a key feature of the ACF literature and is more likely 
to occur during the types of technical disputes that dominate administrative processes. 
Policy-oriented learning requires that two or more coalitions have the technical 
capacity to participate in debate and occurs when secondary aspects of belief 
systems are in dispute (Litfin, 2000; Meijerink, 2005; Weible et al., 2009). Hence, we 
retest the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: “Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when 
there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between two coalitions. This 
requires that: (a) each has the technical resources to engage in such a debate; 
and that (b) the conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and 
core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important secondary 
aspects of the two belief systems” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997 [H6]). 
 
About the ALP Case Study 
 
The ALP case study has been constructed over the past 15 years through 
dozens of interviews with ALP stakeholders and site visits in Colorado and New Mexico 
(Ellison, 1998a, 1998b). There are two aspects of the case study that are critical to a 
deep, process-oriented analysis of this type of political activity: the narrative and the 
types of outputs that are examined. Although this is not a narrative analysis (Roe, 
1994), understanding the story of the ALP project is essential to understanding process 
(Yin, 2008) in policy subsystems. For example, one important caveat of the story is that 
administrators in the Bureau of Reclamation spent years arguing for the project in the 
name of water scarcity and have now spent years arguing for the project in the name of 
water plentitude. Although this sounds improbable, these twists are made through 
administrative activities designed to implement environmental legislation. Hence, the 
case study has primarily focused on policy change in the content of administrative 
outputs. Section 7 consultations, artifacts of ESA implementation, were used for the 
1998 analysis. This analysis is based on the 2000 Final Supplemental Environmental 
Impact Statement (FSEIS) for the Animas-La Plata project, an artifact of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In each of these cases, legislation was passed to 
ratify administrative findings even though the findings contradicted themselves and were 
contrary to broader environmental protection objectives. 
 
Pattern matching is used in this explanatory case study, in which the predicted 
outcomes, via ACF hypotheses, are compared with the actual outcomes (Yin, 2008). 
Testimonial data used for this paper were collected through 13 personal interviews 
conducted with project proponents and opponents—representing local, state, tribal, 
and federal agencies, elected officials, and environmental activists—on two research 
trips to Denver and Durango, Colorado, and Albuquerque, New Mexico, in May 
2006 and March 2008.4 Documentary and archival data on the ALP project were 
collected during these trips at local, state, tribal, and federal agencies and online. 
Triangulation of data is used in this paper to support substantive points and to shore 
up internal validity in the case study (Stoecker, 1991; Yin, 2008). The interviews and 
sources above were used to determine coalition membership and information on 
policy-oriented learning and policy change. 
 
The ALP Project and Settlement of Native American Water Rights 
 
The initial purpose of the ALP project, proposed as early as 1904, was to move 
water from the abundant Animas River, which drains the San Juan Mountains and 
flows steeply through rock and crevice above Durango, Colorado, to the drier La 
Plata River where the land is flatter and more suitable for irrigated agriculture. 
Congress called for a feasibility report in 1956, delivered in 1966, which described 
ALP as a dam and reservoir high on the Animas River with a gravity flow diversion 
to the La Plata River. ALP was authorized for construction in 1968, along with the 
Central Arizona Project and four other Colorado water projects, in the Colorado 
River Basin Project Act (Decker, 1991; Ellison, 1998a, 2009). 
 
Bureau engineers redesigned ALP in the 1970s in response to a variety of 
economic and environmental concerns. In 1979, the Bureau issued a Definite Plan 
Report for ALP that described a project in which water would be lifted hundreds of feet 
out of the Animas River for storage in a series of off-river reservoirs for eventual delivery 
via gravity flow to the La Plata River watershed (Bureau, 1979). Despite the redesign, 
Congress was not able to appropriate funds for ALP because it could not pass tests of 
economic feasibility and because a series of environmental problems had not been 
resolved (Decker, 1991; Ellison, 1999, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, in 1972, the Ute Mountain Ute Indians sued for adjudication and 
quantification of the water rights on their reservation. The water rights issues became 
truly contentious when the Southern Ute Tribe joined the lawsuit because most of the 
irrigable acreage and water on their reservation belongs to Anglo farmers who settled 
there or purchased the land after the reservation was opened to homesteading in 
1899; the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe did not accept the federal government’s land 
allotment program so their reservation belongs entirely to them. Hence, it is important to 
understand that for the most part, ALP is a reclamation project that was to be 
constructed for Anglo farmers on the Southern Ute Reservation, although irrigation 
would have been extended to the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes if 
constructed according to the original plans (Ellison, 1999, 2009). 
 
As the lawsuit, taken up by the U.S. Department of Justice, wound its way 
through the court system, calls by the Carter and then the Reagan Administrations for 
nonfederal cost sharing forced project proponents to develop two agreements in 1986 
that were designed to resolve both the Native American water rights claims and federal 
calls for cost sharing (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1986). ALP would be constructed in 
two phases under the terms of the agreements. Phase one would include the 
economically justifiable pieces of the project and would be constructed and financed by 
the Bureau. Phase two would be paid for by the states and would be built on an 
indeterminate schedule. In exchange for quantification of their water rights on the 
reservations, water rights in the ALP and Dolores projects, and a $60 million tribal 
development fund, the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes agreed to relinquish 
their water rights claims if phase one of ALP was completed by 2000. Congress ratified 
these agreements in the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988 (PL 
100–585). 
 
The ESA requires that action agencies consult with the U.S. FWS when a project 
impacts an endangered or threatened species and when new information regarding 
those impacts becomes available. In May 1990, just as the Bureau was to begin 
construction on ALP, the Service determined that ALP would harm the endangered 
Colorado pikeminnow and issued a draft jeopardy biological opinion without a 
Reasonable and Prudent Alternative (RPA; Ellison, 1998a). This decision meant that the 
project would not go forward unless the Bureau and the FWS could develop a plan to 
allow both the project and the pikeminnow to coexist. After contentious negotiations, the 
FWS issued a final jeopardy biological opinion on ALP that did include an RPA. Two 
elements formed the heart of the seven-year timeline for the RPA: (i) The Bureau 
agreed to limit the construction of the ALP project to three initial features— Ridges 
Basin Reservoir, Durango Pumping Plant, and the inlet conduit—and to limit depletions 
from the Animas River to 57,100 acre-feet; and (ii) to spill three hundred thousand acre-
feet of water from Navajo Reservoir to mimic the natural hydrograph for the benefit of 
the Colorado pikeminnow (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1991). 
 
Both of these components were contentious because they violated the spirit of 
congressional intent for ALP and harmed the Navajo Nation, which had a prior claim on 
the water spilled from Navajo Reservoir (Ellison, 1998a, 2009; Gosnell, 2001). The 
implementing regulations for the ESA states that an alternative is reasonable and 
prudent if it can be implemented according to the intended purposes of a project, avoids 
jeopardy to the species, is within the agency’s legal authority, and is economically and 
technically feasible (50 C.F.R. Part 402, Final Rule, Federal Register, June 3, 1986). 
The construction of these three initial features would not transfer water to the La Plata 
River or have an irrigation component. Perhaps most importantly, the Bureau did not do 
an economic feasibility analysis on the three features because they would produce no 
benefits and represented only an incremental step in the construction of the entire 
project—a contention that is in clear violation of reclamation law and the implementing 
regulations for the ESA (Ellison, 1998a). 
 
ALP and Implementation of the National EPA 
 
With their project in disarray and under fire from a variety of groups and 
agencies, such as the Navajo Nation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. FWS, the 
U.S. EPA, etc., the Bureau reorganized. Bureau administrators authored yet another 
environmental impact statement—designed to justify a different purpose for the ALP 
project—settled their issues with the Navajo Nation by promising to build a municipal 
pipeline for them, sought and earned reauthorization for the project in the Colorado Ute 
Settlement Act Amendments of 2000 (PL 106–554), and are nearly ready to fill the 
newly built and renamed Nighthorse Reservoir with water from the Animas River. Most 
impressively, this was done by eliminating project beneficiaries rather than adding them. 
The nearly complete $668 million ALP project does not provide a single drop of water to 
anyone, although it does store small amounts of municipal and industrial water for 
several water users who have no capacity to deliver municipal and industrial water, 
including 33,050 acre-feet of water for the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes. 
Still, as improbable as this reads, Bureau administrators were able to do this without a 
water right for the project (Doe & Maynard, 2008). 
 
The most important political variable that gave Bureau administrators the 
leverage they needed to seek reauthorization of ALP was the Colorado Ute Water 
Rights Settlement Act of 1988 (PL 100–585). This statute, as noted earlier, settled 
Native American water rights claims by establishing a 2000 construction deadline for 
ALP (Ellison, 1998a). Thus, as endangered species, scientific, and fiscal processes 
made it clear that this deadline would not be met, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt 
and Colorado governor Roy Romer created a process designed to resolve the ALP 
impasse in the mid-1990s. The Romer/Schoettler Process—also named after Colorado 
Lt. Governor Gail Schoettler—brought a variety of groups to the negotiating table—
including several project opponents such as Earth Justice—and produced a justification 
for a scaled-down ALP-Lite with both structural and nonstructural components that 
could be used to meet the needs of the Ute Tribes. These components 
included, for example, the expansion of existing federal water storage facilities in the 
San Juan River Basin, water conservation proposals, and a fund for the acquisition of 
water rights (Marston, 1996). 
 
Although a catalyst for change, Secretary Babbitt rejected the Romer/Schoettler 
proposal and instead entered a series of secret negotiations with the Ute Tribes and the 
project proponents (Doe & Maynard, 2008; Marston, 1996). The result of these 
negotiations was an ALP project that eliminated the irrigation component, included a 
municipal and industrial reservoir for the Ute Tribes, the Navajo Nation, and several 
special districts, provided a $40 million fund for the Ute Tribes to purchase water rights, 
and offered to construct the Navajo Nation Municipal Pipeline. Included in the 
proposal—which came to be known as the Administration proposal in the environmental 
analysis—was a promise to subject the project to a “full environmental review, including 
a review of competing non-structural proposals to settle the Tribes’ water rights claims” 
(Hayes, 2000, p. 3). 
 
One fundamental problem that Bureau officials confronted in conducting a new 
environmental analysis of ALP was undoing decades of work that supported the 
argument that the purpose of the ALP project was irrigation. Indeed, the Bureau argued 
in the 1966 Feasibility Study, the 1979 Definite Plan Report, the 1980 Final 
Environmental Impact Statement, the 1991 Biological Opinion, the 1996 Final 
Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement, and other administrative 
documents that the purpose of ALP was to bring irrigation water to the “dry side,” or the 
La Plata River watershed; all of these administrative documents were ratified by 
Congress in various statutes (Ellison, 2009). 
 
Three things needed to be done to address this argumentation problem. First, the 
Bureau had to eliminate the irrigation component without losing the project outright. 
Second, the Bureau needed to appease rival water users in the San Juan River Basin. 
And third, all of this needed to be sanctioned by Congress. At the heart of all these 
activities was the need to develop an environmental impact statement—in conjunction 
with the recommendations of the Romer/Schoettler process—that provided an 
administrative justification for a scaled-down ALP project and that gave the competing 
interests in the San Juan River Basin their due. 
 
The environmental impact analysis gave Bureau officials the opportunity to 
eliminate the irrigation component and redefine the project. This redefinition of the 
project came in two parts. In the first part, Bureau officials brazenly noted that they were 
never able to prove that the project made sense from an environmental perspective 
despite all the administrative activity and studies on it. Indeed, in its 2000 
Record of Decision, the Bureau stated that 
 
the original project was not constructed because this Department, and many 
other parties, raised serious concerns regarding the environmental 
consequences of building the project. These consequences included a large 
diversion from the Animas River which would violate Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) requirements and water quality impacts associated with a major new non-
Indian project in the Four Corners region. (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000b, p. 
1) 
 
Although innocuous, this statement confirms that water-quality impacts—that is, the 
high selenium content in irrigation runoff from non-Indian farming, a longstanding issue 
for the Environmental Protection Agency (Lemly, 1997)—were an impediment to project 
construction. 
 
Second, through the Record of Decision and related administrative documents, 
Bureau officials maintained their obligation to Native American trust responsibilities, 
specifically the water rights claims of the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute 
Tribes, and the constant threat of “extensive litigation” if these claims were not 
redressed (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000b). These contentions, along with the 
2000 construction deadline established by the Colorado Ute Water Rights Settlement 
Act of 1988, produced the “purpose and need” for the new ALP project, which is the 
fundamental concept that drove the analysis for the environmental impact statement. 
The “purpose and need” of the ALP project was to 
 
implement the Settlement Act by providing the Ute Tribes an assured long term 
water supply and water acquisition fund in order to satisfy the Tribes’ senior 
water rights claims as quantified in the Settlement Act, and to provide for 
identified M&I needs in the project area. (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a, 
vol. 1, chap. 5, p. 21) 
 
The analysis in the new environmental impact statement focused on the 
assessment of various alternatives designed to address the Colorado Ute Tribes’ water 
rights claims. These included the Administration Proposal at various reservoir levels, 
increasing the size of federal water facilities in the area, and nonstructural alternatives 
such as water leasing and the establishment of a fund to purchase water rights. 
These alternatives would be compared with the purpose and need and assessed along 
four dimensions: yield, reliability, location, and practicality. Yield refers to whether the 
project will provide “wet water” to the tribes, reliability refers to whether the alternative 
will be renewed by the hydrological cycle, location refers to whether water from the 
alternative will be “reasonably available” to the tribes, and practicability refers to 
whether the alternative is technically feasible (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). 
 
These criteria ensure that only the administration proposal—the same project the 
Bureau hoped to build under the 1991 RPA—would be acceptable. Moreover, since the 
administration proposal defined ALP as a Native American water rights project, it 
became subject to the rules of the Indian Self Determination and Education 
Assistance Act (PL 93–638), which gives Native Americans a substantive stake in the 
nature of the public goods and services they receive from the United States. In this 
case, the effect of tribal participation in the administrative process was to give the 
Colorado Ute Tribes a veto over any alternative that did not meet their claims, which up-
front did not include nonstructural alternatives, the expansion of existing facilities, or 
water leasing—i.e., the alternatives that were under consideration in the environmental 
impact analysis (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000b). 
 
There were two additional problems that went to the Bureau’s assessment of 
ALP as a municipal and industrial water supply for Native Americans, both of which 
were analyzed in the ALP Final Environmental Impact Statement: (i) finding demand for 
municipal and industrial water, and (ii) addressing the risks associated with changing 
water rights from irrigation to municipal and industrial. In the 2000 environmental impact 
analysis, the Bureau assessed municipal and industrial demand through an analysis of 
nonbinding water-use scenarios. These scenarios were purely speculative. The Bureau, 
for example, used data from the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate that the Native 
American population on the reservations would increase from 3,287 in 1998 to 15,000 in 
2100. The result of this strictly linear projection, Bureau officials argued, would be a 
future housing shortage and resultant demand for new municipal and industrial water on 
the reservation. Other scenarios included an industrial park scenario, recreation and 
tourism scenario, energy development scenario, livestock and wildlife development 
scenarios, and regional water supply scenario (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). 
Although serving as the basis for ALP, the Bureau noted that each of these scenarios 
was nonbinding and would require the construction of new structural components that 
would be subject to future NEPA review. The benefit of this nonbinding scenario 
approach, the Bureau contended, was that it “respects the Colorado Ute Tribes’ 
sovereignty and protects their ability to allocate water in accordance with future needs 
consistent with federal law” (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000b, p. 3). 
 
The second problem arose with respect to the nonstructural component of ALP 
as envisioned in the administration proposal alternative. Under the 1988 Settlement 
Act, the Colorado Ute Tribes were entitled to over seventy-nine thousand acre-feet of 
water. But because this water was for irrigation—which has a smaller return flow than 
municipal and industrial water—the entitlement was reduced to approximately 52,960 
acre-feet, of which 39,960 acre-feet would be stored in Nighthorse Reservoir (U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). The remaining thirteen thousand acre-feet will be 
acquired though the purchase of land and water rights on or near the reservations 
through the $40 million water acquisition fund established by the 2000 Colorado Ute 
Settlement Act Amendments (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). The problem, 
however, is that the purchase of land and water rights on a willing-seller/willing buyer 
basis, and the conversion of those water rights is no simple matter and may take 10–30 
years to complete. The Bureau notes that the risks associated with this approach 
include but are not limited to the risk of availability of lands with senior water rights, the 
risk associated with estimating the rate of inflation of land prices, the risk associated 
with the assumption that there would be no disruption to market prices of land, and the 
risks of encountering higher costs resulting from a longer procurement period for land 
purchases (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). These risks must be added to the 
problem of converting fee simple farmland to Indian trust land, which will reduce local 
tax bases, and of course the problem of converting these water rights from irrigation to 
municipal and industrial in the Colorado water courts. Bureau officials warn: 
 
[s]everal legal considerations and constraints that may affect the change of 
irrigation water rights to M&I use, include but are not limited to . . . the need for 
court approval . . . the need to deal with numerous objectors . . . time required for 
change can be substantial . . . uncertainty of outcome. (U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 2000a, vol. 1, chap. 2, pp. 2–16) 
 
Hence, the administrative findings used to justify reauthorization of ALP were 
constructed on the argument that the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes should 
settle their claims for the construction of a municipal and industrial water project for 
which there is no water right, no demand, and no capacity to deliver the water. 
Furthermore, all this was to be done to avoid costly litigation over water rights—the 
costs of which were never determined. Based on these arguments, Congress 
reauthorized ALP in the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000, which gave 
the Bureau the authority to construct, operate and maintain “a reservoir, a pumping 
plant, a reservoir inlet conduit, and appurtenant facilities with sufficient capacity to divert 
and store water from the Animas River to provide for an average annual depletion of 
57,100 acre-feet of water to be used for a municipal and industrial water supply . . .” 
 
 
 
 
Advocacy Coalitions 
 
In 1998, Ellison found that three primary coalitions were competing in the policy 
subsystem for control of the ALP project. These were a distributive coalition, anchored 
by the Bureau of Reclamation; a Native American water development coalition, loosely 
held together by the Bureau of Indian Affairs; and an environmental protection coalition 
(largely regulatory), anchored by the FWS. Belief systems ranged from project 
construction (distributive) to Native American/water development (developmental) to 
concern for the environment (regulatory). Table A1 in the Appendix shows a lineup of 
the key members of each of these coalitions around the time of the passage of the 
Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988. In the 1991 contest over the 
construction of the RPA, the Bureau won out by conceding both secondary aspects of 
its belief system and its ability to dominate administrative process. The ACF predicts: 
 
Hypothesis 1: “On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy 
core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather 
stable over periods of a decade or so (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999 [H1]).” 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the ALP project is how we might categorize the 
project’s proponents and opponents and how they are organized into coalitions since 
1991. In general, proponents of ALP are elites: members of Congress with direct ties 
to the project, Secretaries of the Interior, administrators in the Bureau of Reclamation, 
the water conservancy and conservation districts that were created by the Colorado 
General Assembly to lobby for water projects with public funds, elected officials in 
Colorado, the Colorado Water Conservation Board, and tribal attorneys and some tribal 
leaders. Project opponents include members of the general public, concerned 
taxpayers, environmentalists, and independent analysts with expertise in economics or 
engineering. Although certainly not a scientific measure of public opinion, the testimony 
and written comments on the 2000 FSEIS reported in Volume 3a clearly supports the 
categorization of proponents and opponents as elite advocates for 
Native American water rights versus citizens worried about environmental and fiscal 
issues. These two groups form what might be called the distributive coalition and the 
regulatory coalition, respectively. 
 
Both coalitions have lost members since 1991, however (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix). Most strikingly, for the distributive coalition, what is missing from the 
administrative processes that supported reauthorization of the project is any concern for 
the Anglo farmers who were set to receive the tens of thousands of acre-feet of water 
for irrigation under previous conceptions of ALP. Gone are the “dry-side” farmers of the 
La Plata River watershed, only to be replaced by the advocates of industrial parks, 
housing developments, and coal- and gas-fired power plants (U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 2000a, vol. 1, chap. 2, pp. 117–23). 
 
The farmers were replaced by Native Americans, who have struggled throughout 
American history for support from the U.S. government. This is the truism under which 
the ALP project has been constructed. But while the Bureau and its allies had 
been making this argument for some time, it was the Romer/Schoettler Process that 
brought broader legitimacy to the idea that a tribal water war in southwestern Colorado 
would be a disaster. Moreover, the process produced a justification for a scaled-down, 
municipal and industrial water project (Hayes, 2000; Marston, 1996; Pontius, 1997). The 
justification, essentially, was that settlement of the Ute Tribes’ water rights was so 
critical that all interests in the project were required to give up or reduce their claims as 
ALP went from a diversion of 191,230 to 57,100 acre-feet. 
 
Moreover, as the size and scope of the project was reduced, the effect was to 
remove claimants, resolve problems by default, and hence eliminate effective 
opposition—meaning that agencies and participants with regulatory interests withdrew 
from the regulatory coalition. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s selenium 
concerns were eliminated when the irrigation component was removed from the project. 
The Navajo Nation became a supporter when it was given the Navajo Nation Municipal 
pipeline. Once the Native Americans in the San Juan River Basin, including the Jicarilla 
Apache, came together to support the project, Earth Justice (formerly the Sierra Club 
Legal Defense Fund), a longtime ALP foe, dropped its active opposition to the project 
because it did not want to be perceived as “anti-Indian” (Doe & Maynard, 2008). The 
success of the San Juan River Recovery Implementation Program—the agreement to 
spill water from Navajo Reservoir to benefit endangered fishes—placated the U.S. FWS 
(Brooks, 2008). Coordinated efforts by the Bureau and government lawyers from the 
Departments of Interior and Justice simply outspent local opponents, such as the 
Citizens Progressive Alliance, that challenged them in court (Doe & Maynard, 2008). 
 
While it may seem that the Bureau and its allies lost this policy conflict since they 
were forced to settle for a project that delivers no actual benefits to farmers, 
municipalities, or Native Americans—no irrigation, no actual delivery of municipal and 
industrial water, and storage with no access for the tribes—it is the case that ALP is a 
political project that protects and preserves the policy core beliefs of the distributive 
coalition. By settling Native American water rights claims through the project, the 
Bureau was able to build a dam and reservoir and protect the Law of the River—the 
Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the collection of state statutes that implement it 
(Reisner, 1993). In other words, the only reasonable solution to the water rights claims 
of the Colorado Ute Indians was to change the law and allow interstate water marketing. 
By quantifying their water rights, for example, the Ute Tribes could simply sell their 
water downstream, without storage, to Las Vegas or California. This is an untenable 
prospect for those who control water resources management and development in the 
western United States because the system is constructed on state competition to store 
allocations under the Compact (Doe & Maynard, 2008; Seaholm, 2008). The 
construction of ALP therefore demonstrates the extraordinary steadfastness of the 
dominant coalition in the subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute and 
confirms previous findings. 
 
 
 
 
Policy Change 
 
The ACF theory predicts that policy core attributes are unlikely to be significantly 
revised as long as the governing coalition that built a program remains in power. 
External events, policy-oriented learning, internal events such as significant actors 
leaving the subsystem, or alternative dispute resolution can affect subsystem dynamics 
and threaten the status of governing coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). In 1998, 
Ellison described how the Bureau used its prowess in administrative process and 
“Indians versus fish” rhetoric to maintain control of the subsystem in response to internal 
and external threats, affirming the AFC prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 2: “The policy core attributes of a governmental program are unlikely 
to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition which 
instituted the program remains in power” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997 [H4]). 
 
Since 1998, the policy core attributes of the ALP project have not been significantly 
revised. Indeed, the primary result of the 2000 FSEIS and the 2000 Colorado Ute 
Settlement Act Amendments is that the Bureau was authorized to construct the features 
it wanted to construct under the 1991 RPA—Ridges Basin Dam and Reservoir, the 
Durango pumping plant, and the inlet conduit—under significantly improved financial 
conditions for members of the coalition. This contention is supported by legislative 
action on the project. The Romer/Schoettler Process, for example, produced a piece of 
legislation that was introduced in the House of Representatives. The Colorado Ute 
Settlement Act Amendments of 1998 (105th Congress, S. 1771) is very similar to the 
act of 2000 because it would have authorized construction of the three initial features, 
but it did not include a $40 million fund for the tribes and also maintained the cost-share 
arrangements envisioned in the 1988 Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act. 
Hence, the 1998 bill would have required the San Juan Water Commission, the ALP 
Water Conservancy District, and the State of Colorado to put up $8.6 million, $4.4 
million, and $16 million, respectively, for the project (105th Congress, S. 1771). Project 
proponents in the House and Senate seem to have let the 1998 bill die without a fight. 
Another bill on ALP was also introduced in the 105th Congress. H.R. 745, introduced by 
Representative Peter DeFazio, sought to “deauthorize the Animas-La Plata Federal 
reclamation project, and to direct the Secretary of the Interior to enter into negotiations 
to satisfy, in a manner consistent with all Federal laws, the water rights interests of the 
Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe and the Southern Ute Indian Tribe.” This legislation failed 
to make it out of the House Subcommittee on Water and Power (HR 105–745). 
 
In 2000, the primary sponsors of the new Colorado Ute Settlement Act 
Amendments, Representative Scott McInnis (R-Colorado) and Senator Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell (R-Colorado), addressed the flaws of the 1998 legislation: The Colorado 
Ute Tribes were given a $40 million fund to purchase water rights on the reservations, 
no cost share was required by non-Indian participants, and the Navajo Nation Municipal 
Pipeline was authorized for construction. Hence, with the support of the 2000 FSEIS—
which redefined the project as a Native American water project—neither the State of 
Colorado nor local project proponents were expected to pay for it. Finally, in an effort to 
stop all future ALP development, Senator Russ Feingold introduced an amendment to 
the Colorado Ute Settlement Act that would have deauthorized the project under 
previous legislation (Amendment 4362). The amendment would have also required 
repayment of construction, fish and wildlife mitigation, and recreation costs by all non-
Indian project participants. Senator Feingold’s amendment failed to pass by a roll-call 
vote of 56 to 34 (Congressional Record, 2000, p. S10985). Thus, the ALP project 
envisioned under the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act and the 1988 Colorado Ute 
Indian Water Rights Settlement Act is still authorized for construction. 
 
Support of the 2000 Colorado Ute Settlement Act ensured that the federal 
government would pay for ALP. But the cost-sharing concept was just as critical to the 
1988 ALP authorization as was the settlement of Native American water rights. 
As noted previously, the 1988 legislation ratified the 1986 cost-share agreement—
demanded by the Reagan Administration—and the Colorado Ute Indian water rights 
settlement. This legislative feat, undoing the cost-sharing concept while simultaneously 
arguing that the 1988 Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act had not been 
implemented because the Bureau did not meet its 2000 construction deadline, was 
made possible and organized around the 2000 FEIS, which defined ALP as a Native 
American water project. Indeed, the 2000 Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments 
ratify the findings of the 2000 FEIS: “(10) Based upon paragraph (8), it is the intent of 
Congress to enact legislation that implements the Record of Decision referred to in 
paragraph (8)(F).” Even more importantly, in this context, Native Americans do not have 
to reimburse the federal government when irrigation projects are constructed for them 
under the terms of the 1932 Leavitt Act. Native Americans do, however, have to pay for 
operational expenses on municipal and industrial projects, which were deferred under 
the 2000 legislation. 
 
Policy-Oriented Learning 
 
In 1998, Ellison described how Bureau administrators were able to maintain 
control of the subsystem through administrative prowess in technical disputes with 
the FWS, although in the end they were forced to concede secondary aspects of their 
belief systems. Since 1991, however, Bureau administrators have been able to redefine 
the project and force their competitors to concede effective opposition to it. In effect, 
Bureau administrators have checked the possibility of policy-oriented learning across 
belief systems. The ACF theory predicts: 
 
Hypothesis 3: “Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when 
there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between two coalitions. This 
requires that: (a) Each has the technical resources to engage in such a debate; 
and that (b) the conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and 
core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important secondary 
aspects of the two belief systems” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999 [H6]). 
 
Perhaps the most important evidence to support the contention that Bureau 
administrators were able to undo effective opposition is revealed in the agency’s cynical 
response to demands for an economic feasibility study: Bureau administrators refused 
to assess economic feasibility while arguing that the project should be constructed to 
save money. How is this possible? 
 
The Bureau touted in the Record of Decision that the cost of Refined Alternative 
4 at $278 million was “less than half the cost [of the $700 million] associated with the 
ALP concept incorporated into the original settlement” (Bureau, 200b, p. 3). The 
Bureau updated its cost estimate in 2003 to $500 million and has maintained that figure 
as the project nears completion (Longwell, 2008; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
2003). There are a host of additional costs associated with the project that the Bureau 
does not systematically assess. For example, Bureau officials describe a variety of 
nonbinding water use scenarios that will require the construction of additional facilities 
before the water can be delivered, but they do not estimate the costs of those facilities 
(U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a, vol. 1, chap. 2, Map 2–8, pp. 2–119). As noted 
earlier, the Bureau contends that these scenarios are for analytical purposes only and 
are left open in order to protect the Ute Tribes’ sovereignty and ability to make decisions 
in the future. But these facilities will be part of the ALP project and must be constructed 
before the Colorado Ute Tribes’ water is put to beneficial use. 
 
Most interestingly, while the project is being constructed in order to avoid the 
“extensive litigation” that will occur if the Ute Tribes sue for adjudication of their federal 
reserve water rights, the costs of this litigation are never estimated. The Bureau 
contends that it is not possible to estimate these costs and that it is not required to do 
so under the Council of Environmental Quality guidelines that govern the 
implementation of the NEPA (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a). The Bureau defends 
its position most eloquently in the General Comments & Responses section of the 2000 
FSEIS, noting that while the intention of benefit–cost guidelines are to ensure that 
reclamation projects provide a “net benefit to national economic development,” the 
purpose of ALP is: 
 
1. avoiding the direct and indirect costs of continued litigation; 
 
2. resolving potential damage claims that tribes may bring against the United States for 
failure to protect trust resources or against other parties for interference with the tribes’ 
use of those resources; 
 
3. acting in concert with the U.S. trust responsibility to Indian tribes; and 
 
4. avoiding the costs associated with widespread displacement of non-Indian water 
users. (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a, vol. 3a, p. GC-1; italics ours) 
 
Once again, the Bureau maintains that the purpose of ALP is not to make a 
national investment but to avoid the “costs of litigation” and settle Indian trust 
responsibilities. But the authorities the Bureau cites in the 2000 FSEIS do not support 
this position. The Water Resource Council’s Economic and Environmental Principles 
and Guidelines—the fundamental criteria the Bureau uses to conduct benefit–cost 
analysis—does not include a concept that can be used to draw a distinction between 
Indian and non-Indian water projects (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983). The 
Bureau also notes that it does not need to conduct an economic feasibility study 
under the terms of Secretarial Order no. 3215, the Secretary of the Interior’s policy 
regarding the discharge of Native American trusts responsibilities. But this policy 
calls on Department of Interior officials to maintain sound management practices 
and does not relieve the Bureau of its financial responsibilities under reclamation law 
(U.S. Department of the Interior, 2000). 
 
Additionally, Bureau officials cite President George H. W. Bush’s policy regarding 
Indian water rights settlements, which urges agencies to avoid litigation when it comes 
to the settlement of Native American water rights claims (U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1990). But this policy, like those previously cited, does not relieve the Bureau of 
its benefit–cost responsibilities. Indeed, the policy still requires that the Bureau estimate 
the value of litigation in order to calculate legal exposure, ensure that the value of the 
settlement does not exceed the costs of litigation, ensure that nonfederal parties to the 
settlement engage in appropriate cost sharing, ensure that settlements “promote 
economic efficiency on reservations and tribal self-sufficiency;” etc. (U.S. Department of 
the Interior, 1990). These analytical activities were not performed. This one-sided 
technical debate over the project’s economics—a project that costs millions but delivers 
no water—occurred because the Bureau eliminated its capable competitors in the 
subsystem. 
 
Discussion: The Role of Agencies in Advocacy Coalitions 
 
The question that emerges from the previous section, however, is how Bureau 
administrators were able to get away with this. It should seem obvious to the casual 
observer that the benefit of the project is settlement of tribal water rights and that the 
value of that benefit must exceed $668 million in today’s dollars. The answer is that 
there has been extensive criticism of the project and these administrative processes but 
that it has gone unheeded. Indeed, the Bureau published them in Volume 3 of the 2000 
FSEIS. This volume is full of reasoned, analytical commentary on the project in the form 
of transcripted oral testimony and written reports. The Citizens Progressive 
Alliance—an organization representing local opposition to the project—noted that a 
benefit–cost analysis was not conducted, that a water right for the project did not exist, 
that nonstructural alternatives were not properly considered, etc. A host of other writers 
and commentators complained about the project’s environmental harm. Indeed, Earth 
Justice in preface to a detailed, analytical brief on the FSEIS wrote: 
 
Many of these problems stem from one basic flaw. The Bureau clearly 
determined in advance that this [FSEIS] would find that Alternative 4 was the 
only practicable alternative, and that Alternative 6 was not a practicable 
alternative. As you are aware, Mr David Hayes of the Department of the Interior 
clearly stated that this NEPA process was intended to be used ‘defensively’, and 
that any analysis would demonstrate that the non-structural alternative would not 
work. Since the Bureau set out to find that a non-structural alternative would not 
work, that is what it found. That finding comes, however, at the expense of an 
analysis that comports with the law. (Earth Justice, Letter to Pat Schumacher, 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2000a, Volume 3) 
 
Federal, state, and local agencies also provided comments—some, such as the EPA 
and the FWS, expressed mild concern—most of which were positive. Native Americans, 
including the Navajo Nation, also provided support for the project (U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 2000b, vol. 3a and 3b). 
 
What is clear is that effective opposition to the project ceased when federal 
agencies with regulatory interests in the project, namely the EPA and the FWS, were 
placated by Bureau administrators through concession of secondary aspects of their 
belief systems. FWS biologists wanted Bureau administrators to concede that rivers 
could be regulated to protect endangered species (Brooks, 2008). With that concession, 
the FWS dropped its opposition to the project. The EPA was concerned with selenium 
contamination to the river systems from irrigation return flows. Once Bureau managers 
dropped the irrigation component, the EPA dropped its opposition to the project. In both 
cases, the effect in the subsystem was that the regulatory coalition could no longer 
successfully oppose the distributive coalition. The regulatory coalition did not go away 
when the FWS and the EPA were placated—citizens’ groups, academics, journalists, 
and environmental interest groups continued to oppose the project—but without a 
federal agency to anchor the coalition, it was much less effective because of lack of 
resources, organization, etc. (see Table A2 in the Appendix). Similarly, the old 
developmental coalition that was anchored by the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs was 
simply absorbed into the distributive coalition. 
 
Likewise, it is important to note that agency allies in advocacy coalitions seem to 
be dispensable to agencies. The FWS seems to have had no allegiance to 
environmental interest groups and concerned citizens who supported it during conflicts 
with the Bureau over endangered species. The EPA did not provide continued support 
to project opponents after it was placated. Most importantly, the Bureau’s ability to 
withstand the loss of irrigators as allies in the distributive coalition signals a significant 
change in reclamation politics. Indeed, none of the traditional supporters of 
reclamation—from the Colorado Water Conservation Board, to long-standing project 
proponents such as Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, to the local water conservation 
districts, to the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes—bemoaned the loss of 
agriculture in ALP (Cone, 2008; Doe & Maynard, 2008; Longwell, 2008; Seaholm, 
2008). 
 
These insights lead us to suggest some refinements in the ACF. Federal 
agencies, specifically in distributive policy subsystems, provide both the anchors and 
support systems for the development and maintenance of belief systems. Furthermore, 
as creators and managers of belief systems, agencies with political, technical, and 
administrative prowess are needed to confront active opposition to coalition goals in 
policy subsystems over time.5 When federal agencies provide the necessary support 
system—ample resources, similarities in core beliefs, expertise, etc.—the advocacy 
coalition is reinforced. However, advocacy coalitions that are not anchored by federal 
agencies are less capable of standing up for themselves in policy subsystems because 
they do not have adequate resources, access to political institutions, ability to control 
administrative process, or the capacity to deliver public goods and services. Thus, 
successful advocacy coalitions are dependent on agencies for leadership and the 
maintenance of belief systems. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Refinement 1: The policy core attributes of a governmental program are unlikely 
to be significantly revised if the subsystem advocacy coalition, which instituted 
the program, is anchored by a federal agency. 
 
Additionally, administrators provide the essence of advocacy coalition stability. This 
does not mean that legislators or elected executives do not have an influence on 
advocacy coalitions. But more often than not, legislators and elected officials are 
guided by administrative argumentation, which reflects both the need for efficiency 
in complex policy arenas and the ability of administrators to use political support to 
protect their jurisdictions. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
Refinement 2: Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when 
there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between two coalitions that are 
anchored by agencies. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Bureau of Reclamation will complete the ALP project because it controls the 
administrative processes that are essential to natural resources management decision 
making. The Bureau has spent at least $68 million over the past several decades on 
administrative and technical argumentation in support of the project, and Congress has 
continued to ratify those reports and analyses in successive legislative acts on ALP. 
The Bureau has also remained in control of the administrative processes that are 
essential to coalition success. By placating the EPA and the FWS in the NEPA process, 
for example, the Bureau eliminated administrative static and was able to speak to 
Congress more effectively. In the end, consistent with many theories of policy 
formulation, it took only a few key people to push for reauthorization and construction of 
the project, such as Congressional sponsors, key Colorado politicians, Bureau officials, 
and local supporters. Indeed, project proponents have become so brazen that U.S. 
Justice Department attorneys have audaciously maintained that ALP must be 
constructed because “Congress has spoken” (Doe & Maynard, 2008). These attorneys 
do not point out that the Colorado Ute Settlement Act Amendments of 2000 begin on 
page 258 (through 266) of a 710-page omnibus appropriations statute and is 
sandwiched between the Vietnam Education Foundation Act of 2000, which allows 
academic exchanges between the United States and Vietnam, and designation of the 
American Museum of Science and Energy in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It is unlikely that 
any member of Congress who voted in favor of PL 106–554 knew the details of the bill. 
 
The ALP provides an opportunity to use the ACF to examine the stability of 
policy-producing coalitions over time in the face of implementation complexities. 
By returning to this policy, we have been able to examine subsystem activity for an 
additional 10 years. This case study demonstrates how the distributive coalition—
anchored by the Bureau of Reclamation—used the administrative process to defeat its 
rivals in the policy process. After the policy supporting construction of ALP collapsed, 
the Bureau was able to build a new coalition to support construction of the project based 
on the settlement of Native American water rights. This offers insight into the role of 
bureaucratic agencies and their ability to coordinate and direct the policy process in the 
distributive policy arena and suggests that anchoring by federal agencies is beneficial to 
the advocacy coalition. As the Bureau was able to assuage concerns of the regulatory 
coalition, both the EPA and the FWS left the opposing coalition, leaving them without 
agency support. While we believe that anchoring is clearly advantageous in this case, 
and we believe this advantage is generalizable, we do recognize that this assertion is 
based on observations in a single policy arena. Perhaps an analysis of multiple policy 
subsystems would allow a more direct comparison of advocacy coalitions with and 
without anchoring of agencies. 
 
The ACF predicts that advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems will remain 
stable over a period of a decade or more. In 1998, Ellison used the ACF to examine 
subsystem stability and the ALP project and found that the Bureau of Reclamation and 
the distributive coalition outmaneuvered their rivals in regulatory processes in order to 
secure approval of an RPA that was out of compliance with the ESA. Since 1991, the 
distributive coalition has remained dominant in the subsystem and has constructed the 
project, but not without conceding what might seem to be secondary aspects of its belief 
system. But to any scholar of reclamation, the concession of irrigation and the spill of 
hundreds of thousands of acre-feet of developed water in order to build a project with a 
57,100 acre-foot diversion seem out of step. Could it be that reclamation is not a policy 
core belief for the Bureau of Reclamation and its allies? The answer is probably yes, not 
only because ALP is one of the last storage projects the Bureau will build but also 
because it has found new allies in the form of energy developers, Native Americans, 
and the builders of ranchettes. 
 
This does not mean that the ALP case study is atypical of distributive politics and 
subsystem activity. It demonstrates the resiliency of the ACF and confirms previous 
findings. The distributive coalition—led by the Bureau—wanted to build the three initial 
features of the ALP project in 1991. As it became apparent that the policies supporting 
construction of those features, both the idea of building a large reclamation project and 
the legality of the RPA, were on the verge of collapse, the Bureau reorganized and 
sought a new policy that could be used to construct ALP. The Bureau accomplished this 
feat, as it had done many times in the past, via a new administrative process and 
through effective coordination with its allies (cf. Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Although the 
Bureau’s argumentation was absurd—outrageously high legal exposure could be 
avoided through the construction of a project that does not provide water—neither of the 
lead agencies in the regulatory coalition opposed the new ALP because their core 
beliefs were satisfied: Irrigation has been eliminated and in-stream flows were 
protected. The departure of the EPA and the FWS from the subsystem left others with 
regulatory interests—concerned taxpayers, citizen environmentalists, muckrakers, and 
reformers—on their own. 
 
So, how do we reconcile these absurdities? While politicians, the media, and the 
public lambasted Alaska’s bridge to nowhere, why is it that a water project that 
provides no water has been constructed? First, this example demonstrates how an 
executive agency can control the political process through administrative activity. 
The Bureau was able to effectively coordinate supporters and satisfy opposition. 
Members of the public and politicians are far less informed than agencies in complex 
natural resource management issues. Second, core beliefs may not be what they 
seem. The purpose of this project was to protect the Law of the River, the essence of 
western water development, not really to deliver tangible benefits from a dam and 
reservoir. Third, this is an example of adaptation on the part of coalition members. 
Contrary to cases where political actors are not adaptive, or even irrational (cf. 
Espeland, 1998), the ALP demonstrates how actors may concede certain goals, so 
long as their raison d’être is satisfied—in this case, construction of a water project. 
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Notes 
1. The terms “distributive” and “regulatory” are used throughout this manuscript to 
describe the coalitions involved in this policy arena. For further discussion, see Lowi 
(1964). 
 
2. The Bridge to Nowhere, or the Gravina Island Bridge in Alaska, was expected to cost 
$398 million. We contend that the ALP project will cost taxpayers $668 million—a figure 
that is clearly too low given the Bureau’s historical record at underestimating the costs 
of its projects (Reisner, 1993). Total costs include: $500 million to construct the project 
per the 2003 cost estimate; $68 million in sunk costs for planning, design, and 
administration; $49.5 million for economic development on the reservations via PL 100–
585 and $10.5 million from Colorado (part of the 1988 water rights settlement); and $40 
million to the tribes for the purchase of water rights via PL 106–554. These dollars have 
not been discounted for time and risk and sunk costs perhaps should not be included. 
The Bureau estimates that operations, maintenance, and replacement will total 
$1,591,000 per year, and much of that will go to the purchase the electricity needed to 
pump water over 500 feet uphill from the Animas River to the reservoir. Water from the 
reservoir will then be released back into the Animas River. 
 
3. For comprehensive reviews on the major contributions to the ACF literature, see 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) and Weible et al. (2009). 
 
4. The W.C. Kenney Watershed Protection Foundation, Denver, Colorado, provided 
funding for this research. 
 
5. This applies particularly to coalitions that are driven by agencies whose belief 
systems involve administration of projects that help justify their existence and maintain 
their share of resources (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971). This was the case for the 
distributive coalitions. 
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